

















that	the	object	is,	or	if	it	asserts	of	some	object	that	is	not,	that	the	object	is	not	–	and	a	judgment	is	false	if	it	contradicts	that	which	is,	or	that	which	is	not.	(Brentano	1966b:	21)	ii	 	This	statement	is	not	only	reminiscent	of	similar	claims	in	Aristotle,	it	also	anticipates	the	equivalence	principles	that	deflationists	currently	use	in	explicating	the	meaning	of	the	predicate	‘true’,	for	instance	the	principle	used	in	Horwich’s	minimalist	theory	of	truth:		 (E)	The	proposition	that	p	is	true	if	and	only	if	p.	According	to	Horwich,	it	is	the	“underived	acceptance	of	the	equivalence	schema”	that	constitutes	the	meaning	of	the	truth-predicate	(Horwich	2010:	27).	The	principle	that	Brentano	derives	from	Aristotle	differs	from	schema	(E)	in	using	object-variables	instead	of	propositional	variables.	It	therefore	accords	nicely	with	Brentano’s	claim	that	in	making	a	judgment	we	are	not	accepting	a	proposition	as	true,	but	we	are	accepting	objects	as	existing	or	rejecting	them	as	non-existing.	A	slightly	more	perspicuous	formulation	of	the	principle	makes	this	transparent:	(B)		A	judgment	of	the	form	‘X	exists’,	‘X	does	not	exist’,	‘No	X	exists’,	or	‘No	non-X	exists’	is	true,	respectively,	if	and	only	if	an	X	exists,	an	X	does	not	exist,	a	non-X	exists,	or	a	non-X	does	not	exist.	Another	important	difference	between	this	principle	and	principle	(E)	concerns	the	limited	generality	of	(B).	As	it	stands,	it	is	not	a	principle	about	all	judgments	but	only	about	those	of	a	particular	form.	Brentano	believed,	however,	that	he	had	a	method	for	overcoming	this	restriction.	His	plan	was	to	show	that	all	judgments	either	have	existential	form	or	can	be	explained	as	combinations	of	such	judgments	(see	Brandl	2014;	also	CHAP.	10).	If	one	grants	Brentano	that	this	is	possible	–	and	this	is	of	course	a	large	concession	–	principle	(B)	may	be	considered	as	equally	powerful	as	principle	(E).			 Parsons	restricts	his	claim	that	Brentano	was	a	precursor	of	contemporary	deflationism	to	Brentano’s	early	period.	He	agrees	in	this	with	the	received	view	that	in	his	later	years	Brentano	held	a	theory	of	truth	that	must	count	as	robust,	since	it	defines	truth	in	epistemic	terms.	But	in	this	respect,	too,	an	alternative	interpretation	is	available.	
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	 Brentano	mentions	already	in	his	1889	lecture	that	defining	a	concept	(either	implicitly	or	explicitly)	is	not	the	only	way	one	can	explicate	it.	As	a	concept	empiricist,	he	believes	that	we	could	not	understand	a	concept	if	we	had	not	appropriate	experiences	on	which	our	understanding	is	grounded:	“The	ultimate	and	most	effective	means	of	elucidation”,	Brentano	says,	“must	consist	in	an	appeal	to	the	individual’s	intuition,	from	which	all	our	general	criteria	are	derived”	(1966b:	24-5).				 	There	is	then	no	need	to	ascribe	to	Brentano	a	new	definition	of	truth	when	he	refers	to	self-evident	judgments	as	the	primary	bearers	of	truth.	His	concept	empiricism	suffices	to	explain	what	Brentano	has	here	in	mind,	namely	an	argument	that	leads	him	to	reject	Kant’s	epistemology.	Kant’s	conception	of	synthetic	a	priori	judgements	is	closely	related	to	his	doctrine	that	some	of	our	concepts	are	pure	concepts	of	reason.	Space	and	time	are	two	primary	examples	of	concepts	that	are	not	derived	from	experience,	according	to	Kant.	Brentano	rejects	this	claim	as	unfounded	and	offers	instead	an	empiricist	explication	of	space	and	time.	In	a	nutshell,	Brentano	says	that	these	concepts	are	constructed	on	the	basis	of	spatial	and	temporal	experiences.	We	have	experiences	of	things	in	our	vicinity,	and	experiences	of	past,	present,	and	future.	We	also	notice	a	structure	in	these	experiences.	Once	such	structure	is	apparent,	we	can	go	on	to	construct	on	this	basis	the	concept	of	a	three-dimensional	infinite	space,	or	the	concept	of	a	temporal	continuum	that	forms	another	dimension	in	multi-dimensional	space-time	(see	Brentano	1925:	26f.).			 Following	the	same	line,	we	can	see	how	Brentano	applies	concept	empiricism	to	the	concept	of	truth.	He	starts	from	experiences	of	self-evident	judgements	that	provide	us	with	a	basis	for	constructing	this	concept.	Self-evidence	here	is	not	a	subjective	feeling	of	certainty,	or	a	compulsion	to	judge	this	way	or	that	way,	as	Brentano	emphasizes.	Therefore,	he	is	confident	that	a	notion	of	truth	based	on	such	experiences	can	pass	as	an	objective	notion.		 This	interpretation	overcomes	the	problems	facing	the	received	view	of	Brentano’s	account	of	truth.	As	a	deflationist,	Brentano	has	no	need	to	appeal	to	non-real	(pseudo-)things	as	the	terms	of	a	correspondence	relation.	When	Brentano	introduced	non-real	things,	he	did	this	in	the	context	of	his	theory	of	intentionality,	where	he	considered	non-real	things	as	playing	the	role	of	mere	objects	of	thought	(see	CHAP.	4)	From	this	one	should	not	conclude	that	he	gave	these	objects	also	an	important	role	to	
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play	in	his	account	of	truth.	Equally,	the	difficulty	with	explicating	truth	in	terms	of	self-evident	judging	disappears.	That	the	experience	of	self-evidence	is	indispensable	for	acquiring	the	concept	of	truth,	as	Brentano	claims,	does	not	imply	that	it	is	also	indispensable	to	the	nature	or	essence	of	truth.	The	deflationist	principle	(B)	makes	this	clear,	since	it	contains	neither	the	concept	of	‘correspondence’	nor	the	concept	of	‘self-evidence’.		The	question	therefore	remains,	whether	Brentano	ever	moved	beyond	his	early	deflationist	position.	The	following	passage	from	a	manuscript	dated	March	1915	provides	evidence	that	he	elaborated	the	same	idea	only	further:	
Can	we	find	some	other	interpretation	for	‘adaequtio’	which	might	make	the	thesis	[veritas	est	adaequatio	rei	et	intellectus]	more	acceptable?	My	answer	would	be	that	the	thesis	tells	us	no	more	nor	less	than	this:	Anyone	who	judges	that	a	certain	thing	exists,	or	that	it	does	not	exist,	or	that	it	is	possible,	or	impossible,	or	that	it	is	thought	of	by	someone,	or	that	it	is	believed,	or	loved,	or	hated,	or	that	it	has	existed,	or	will	exist,	judges	truly	provided	that	the	thing	in	question	does	exist,	or	does	not	exist,	or	is	possible,	or	is	impossible,	or	is	thought	of,	etc.	(Brentano	1966b:	122)	
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i	The	manuscript,	entitled	“Kurzer	Abriß	einer	allgemeinen	Erkenntnislehre”,	was	published	in	an	earlier	collection	of	Brentano’s	epistemological	writings	(Brentano	1925)	and	therefore	not	included	in	Kraus’s	collection	of	1930.	It	is	translated	and	published	with	related	material	not	included	in	Kraus’s	collection	in	the	appendix	of	Szrednicki	1965.	The	translation	in	Szrednicki	1965	has	been	amended	by	replacing	‘evident’	by	‘self-evident’.		
	ii	I	corrected	the	English	translation	to	make	it	fit	the	German	original:	„wahr	sei	ein	Urteil	dann,	wenn	es	von	etwas,	was	ist,	behaupte,	dass	es	sei;	und	von	etwas,	was	nicht	ist,	leugne,	dass	es	sei.”	Chisholm	unfortunately	translates	„leugnen,	dass	ist”	as	“asserting	that	is	not”,	thereby	mislocating	the	negation	in	the	content	and	not	in	the	quality	of	the	judgment.		
